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evaluate incidental First Amendment harms caused by otherwise permissible 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2019, the then-Chairwoman of the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission, Christy McCormick,1 gave a presentation to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) in which she argued that automatic 
voter registration (AVR) violates the First Amendment.2 Though her speech 
garnered little media attention, her presentation made a novel claim that is 
particularly shocking coming from a top U.S. election official: she suggested 
that AVR is a form of mandatory political speech.3 Because she believes that 
registering to vote is “the embodiment of political speech protected by the 
 
 1 President Barack Obama nominated Christy McCormick, a Republican, to the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) in 2014; she was subsequently elected Chairwoman in 2015. Commissioner Christy 
McCormick, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/about/commissioner-christy-
mccormick/ [https://perma.cc/568W-K7PR]; Meet the Members of Trump’s “Voter Fraud” Commission, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 18, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/meet-members-trumps-voter-fraud-commission#McCormick [https://perma.cc/3KRN-5CKZ].  
She was elected to a second nonconsecutive term as Chairwoman in 2019. McCormick Elected New EAC 
Chairwoman, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.eac.gov/news/
2019/02/22/mccormick-elected-new-eac-chairwoman [https://perma.cc/TPR8-3BRM]. Established by 
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, the EAC is a bipartisan commission tasked with “developing 
guidance to meet HAVA requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and serving as a 
national clearinghouse of information on election administration.” About the U.S. EAC, U.S. ELECTION 
ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/about-the-useac/ [https://perma.cc/97N8-R78V]. 
 2 Christy McCormick, Comm’r, U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, Presentation to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Motor Voter Registration: Modernization and Challenges (August 
2019), https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/Presentation_Christy_McCormick.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KH67-JGPR] [hereinafter McCormick Presentation]; see Rick Hasen, EAC 
Commissioner Christy McCormick Gives Presentation Arguing Against Automatic Voter Registration, 
Suggesting It Violates the 1st Amendment and Raises “Security Concerns” About People Registering to 
Vote, ELECTION L. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=106882 
[https://perma.cc/9SFS-L76F]. 
 3 McCormick Presentation, supra note 2. 
115:169 (2020) A Constitutional Defense of AVR 
171 
[First] Amendment,”4 she concluded that automatically registering voters is 
compelled speech that violates the First Amendment right to “refrain from 
speaking at all.”5 
Commissioner McCormick later deflected any public criticism, stating 
that she was “specifically asked by NCSL to provide a counterpoint and 
share some of the challenges to implementing automatic voter registration.”6 
However, other comments belie Commissioner McCormick’s attempt to 
pass the buck.7 For example, Commissioner McCormick gave a similar 
presentation to the NCSL in 2015 that appeared to stop just short of 
answering “yes” to the self-posed question: “Does Automatic Voter 
Registration [v]iolate the Constitution?”8 And, even more telling are 
Commissioner McCormick’s statements in her capacity as a member of 
President Trump’s voter-fraud commission. In a 2017 speech to the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)—a powerful conservative 
group behind many of the controversial laws passed by Republican state 
legislatures9—she stated, “I do think there is a fundamental question: Does 
automatic voter registration violate the Constitution? Congress, or 
 
 4 Id.. This statement is a change from a presentation she gave in 2015, in which she claimed that 
“[v]oting is inherently political speech,” which is a distinct issue from whether registering to vote is 
speech. Christy McCormick, Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislatures, Legal 
Implications of Automatic Voter Registration, (August 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/documents
/summit/summit2015/onlineresources/Legal_Implications_of_Automatic_Voter_Registration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UG5U-C96S] [hereinafter 2015 Presentation]. 
 5 McCormick Presentation, supra note 2 (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018)). She further argues that an opt-out provision is insufficient to mitigate 
harms to First Amendment freedoms. Id. Though this claim is worth investigating, doing so is beyond the 
scope of this Essay. 
 6 Bill Theobald, Top U.S. Election Official Opposes Automatic Voter Registration, FULCRUM (Aug. 
14, 2019), https://thefulcrum.us/automatic-voter-registration-2639823562 [https://perma.cc/524P-
A3H4]. 
 7 In her same 2019 statement, Commissioner McCormick also reiterated her support for automated 
registration (for example, allowing individuals to register to vote while renewing their drivers’ licenses) 
over automatic voter registration, saying, “[v]oters should give prior consent to registering to vote for a 
variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, indicating political affiliation, choosing to register in a 
different state, or declining to register based on religious objection.” Id. 
 8 2015 Presentation, supra note 4. In her 2015 presentation, Commissioner McCormick laid out a 
strong conception of First Amendment negative speech rights, which she explains as “the right NOT to 
speak.” Id. She then argues for the application of strict scrutiny to AVR and asks several rhetorical 
questions: “Do [states’] reasons [for implementing AVR] constitute a compelling governmental 
interest?”; “Is automatic voter registration narrowly tailored to serve that interest?”; and, “Is [o]pt [o]ut 
[a]dequate?” Id. Her presentation strongly suggests that the answer to each of these questions is “no.” But 
rather than reaching the conclusion that AVR is, in fact, unconstitutional, she finishes with a call to 
“[p]roceed with [c]aution and [d]o [m]ore [r]esearch.” Id.  
 9 See Nancy Scola, Exposing ALEC: How Conservative-Backed State Laws Are All Connected, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/exposing-alec-how-
conservative-backed-state-laws-are-all-connected/255869/ [https://perma.cc/28SG-96EQ]. 
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government, should not be making any law abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . . The First Amendment includes the right not to speak as well as 
the right to speak.”10 
Given the persistence of Commissioner McCormick’s position,11 
evaluating the imminent First Amendment challenge to AVR is a worthwhile 
task. In light of the Roberts Court’s recent compelled speech cases, it is also 
a challenge that should be taken seriously. A realistic—rather than 
idealistic—analysis suggests that the Roberts Court could consider a First 
Amendment attack on AVR far more seriously than the academy might. 
Nevertheless, such a challenge should fail. 
Part I provides a definition of AVR and argues that automatically 
registering voters is fundamentally consistent with the animating principles 
of the First Amendment. In Part II, the Essay offers a constitutional defense 
of AVR. As a threshold matter, First Amendment jurisprudence should 
preclude treating the act of registering to vote as a form of political speech. 
If voter registration is not political speech, then it cannot be that AVR 
unconstitutionally compels the expression of a political idea. Finally, Part III 
warns that a compelled speech challenge to AVR may be taken more 
seriously by the Court than one might expect.  
Though this Essay is first and foremost a constitutional defense of 
AVR, it should also serve as a First Amendment alarm bell. By highlighting 
developing threats to a policy that only two decades ago most would have 
regarded as beyond constitutional challenge, this Essay warns of the 
absurdity of extending emerging fissures in compelled speech doctrine to 
their logical ends. 
 
 10 Sam Levine, 3 Members of Trump Panel Warn of Voter Fraud to Influential Conservative Group, 
HUFFPOST (Dec. 7, 2017, 8:05 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-voter-fraud-commission-
alec_n_5a29bfbde4b069ec48abff48 [https://perma.cc/84DW-XJ7F]. 
 11 Commissioner McCormick is not alone in promoting her position. Numerous conservative 
commentators and policy groups have adopted similar positions. See, e.g., Automatic Voter Registration, 
VOTING INTEGRITY INST., https://votingintegrityinstitute.org/issues/automatic-voter-registration/ 
[https://perma.cc/4XSE-4QP6] (calling the act of registration “undoubtedly an act of political speech”); 
id. (“Many citizens are, in fact, trying to make a political statement when they choose not to register 
because they are not interested in the election or the candidates, believe that their vote will not make a 
difference, or do not wish to participate in politics.”); Robert Knight, Opinion, Countering the Lies of the 
Left, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/18/mandatory-
voter-registration-is-a-bad-idea/ [https://perma.cc/2APF-FUEJ] (“[AVR] violates a citizen’s basic free 
speech rights, such as expressing displeasure with the electoral process by not participating.”). 
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I. AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION AND CORE FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRINCIPLES 
Automatic voter registration is a relatively novel policy that seeks to 
simplify the way Americans register to vote.12 AVR makes two significant 
changes to traditional voter registration systems: first, AVR makes 
registering to vote an “opt-out” rather than “opt-in” process; and second, 
most AVR plans require state agencies that register voters to electronically 
transfer registration information to election administrators, instead of using 
paper forms.13 Unlike the traditional registration system, which requires 
individual citizens to affirmatively register, AVR shifts the burden of voter 
registration onto the state, which would bring our practices in line with those 
of most other major democracies.14 
There are various forms of AVR, but for the purposes of this Essay, I 
assume the format of the “Oregon model.”15 Under this model, an eligible 
voter who interacts with a relevant state agency (like the DMV) “is not asked 
whether they would like to register to vote, but instead is automatically opted 
into registering. The voter is later sent a notification informing them that they 
were registered and that they can opt-out by returning the notification.”16  
AVR does more than simply serve the practical goal of lessening 
burdens on voters. As one policy group describes it, “AVR strengthens 
democracy by expanding and broadening the electorate.”17 A commitment to 
 
 12 Automatic Voter Registration, a Summary, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-voter-registration-summary 
[https://perma.cc/TT74-SV2W]. To date, seventeen states and Washington, D.C. have implemented or 
passed some form of AVR. History of AVR & Implementation Dates, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 29, 
2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/history-avr-implementation-dates 
[https://perma.cc/N5YD-YRVP]. 
 13 Automatic Voter Registration, supra note 12.  
 14 See Wendy R. Weiser, Automatic Voter Registration Boosts Political Participation, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/automatic-voter-registration-boosts-
political-participation [https://perma.cc/PAD4-KEFK]. In fact, many industrialized democracies employ 
something more radical, called universal voter registration, which requires the government to make even 
more of an affirmative effort to register citizens, rather than AVR’s subtle burden shift that simply allows 
eligible voters to register when citizens interact with government agencies for other reasons. See 
Christopher W. Carmichael, Proposals for Reforming the American Electoral System After the 2000 
Presidential Election: Universal Voter Registration, Mandatory Voting, and Negative Balloting, 
23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 255, 302–03 (2002). 
 15 Oregon became the first state to implement AVR in January 2016. Automatic Voter Registration, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 14, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/automatic-voter-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/5YWA-H7GC]. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Rob Griffin, Paul Gronke, Tova Wang & Liz Kennedy, Who Votes with Automatic Voter 
Registration?, CTR. AMER. PROGRESS (June 7, 2017, 8:56 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/democracy/reports/2017/06/07/433677/votes-automatic-voter-registration/ [https://perma.cc/BE
7P-LEXM]. 
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increased civic engagement is at the heart of AVR policy; that is, any citizen 
who is eligible to participate in our democracy should be able to do so. In the 
current political landscape, expanding access to the franchise tends to benefit 
one party more than the other,18 but regardless of AVR’s electoral impacts, 
the policy undeniably serves to broaden the pool of voters. These democratic 
values motivated the implementation of AVR in Oregon, where advocates 
described a desire to develop “a more efficient way to increase civic 
engagement among eligible Oregonians.”19 AVR promises to “cure the ills 
in our democracy with more democracy” as it “remov[es] outdated and 
unnecessary barriers to voter engagement.”20  
By implementing a system that seeks to remove franchise barriers, 
policy makers inherently advance particular moral ideals, such as increasing 
political involvement and enhancing democratic discourse. These values are 
fundamentally consistent with one of the commonly recognized animating 
purposes of the First Amendment.21 Indeed, nearly a century ago, Justice 
Brandeis envisioned a First Amendment driven by an underlying value of 
political discourse: 
Those who won our independence believed that . . . in . . . government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is 
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government.22 
Justice Brandeis identifies speech and assembly as “functions essential 
to effective democracy,” and he focuses on the republican duty to participate 
as he roots the First Amendment in the value of deliberative democracy.23 
Over the last century, First Amendment jurisprudence has largely developed 
 
 18 See, e.g., Philip Ewing, Voting and Elections Divide Republicans and Democrats Like Little Else. 
Here’s Why, NPR (June 12, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/12/873878423/voting-and-
elections-divide-republicans-and-democrats-like-little-else-heres-why [https://perma.cc/S2QR-B32K].  
 19 Griffin et al., supra note 17. 
 20 Pratt Wiley, Massachusetts Expands Voter Access, 63 BOSTON BAR J. 11, 13 (2019). 
 21 In addition to democratic self-governance, other offered First Amendment values include the 
marketplace of ideas and expressive autonomy rationale. See Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech 
Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2164 n.1 (2018); R. George Wright, Why Free 
Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 337–41 (2001).  
 22 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice Brandeis’s 
construction of the First Amendment was effectively endorsed by the Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). 
 23 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377. 
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with reference to these underlying democratic values. From libel to 
patronage and much in between, First Amendment jurisprudence is guided 
by a commitment to “free political discussion to the end that government 
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained 
by lawful means.”24 
Thus, AVR—which lessens the burdens of participating in democracy 
and broadens the electorate—enhances the responsiveness of the deliberative 
democracy at the heart of the First Amendment, making it more likely the 
government is responsive to the will of the whole people. 
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF AVR 
First Amendment doctrine broadly supports the constitutionality of 
AVR. In this Part, I first discuss whether voter registration should be 
considered expression of a political idea, such that AVR amounts to 
unconstitutionally compelled speech. Then, I briefly address what level of 
scrutiny might apply to an AVR challenge. 
A. Should AVR Be Considered Compelled Political Speech? 
 The Supreme Court has very clearly enunciated “the principle that 
freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they 
must say.”25 Under this principle, the Court has struck down numerous 
instances of compelled speech, including a law requiring schoolchildren to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag26 and a law requiring New 
Hampshire drivers to display the state motto—“Live Free or Die”—on their 
license plates.27 However, not all compelled speech is necessarily 
unconstitutional. The government is regularly permitted to compel the 
disclosure of factual information—for example, through financial disclosure 
forms28—without warranting First Amendment protection. The question here 
 
 24 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); see, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 357 (1976) (quoting Ill. State Emps. Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 576 (1972)) (“Patronage . . . is 
‘at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.’”).  
 25 Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006). 
 26 W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 27 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 28 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (“[A]s a general rule, the 
State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers to 
file . . . [a] procedure [that] would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening 
a speaker with unwanted speech during the course of a solicitation.”).  
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is whether registering to vote is the kind of speech that, when compelled, 
triggers First Amendment protection.29  
We must determine, then, if AVR is the compelled expression of an 
opinion or belief, or if it merely compels disclosure of information. The 
question of whether voter registration is properly understood as expressive 
conduct30 for First Amendment purposes has received little, if any, 
scholarly31 or judicial32 attention. Critics of AVR explain that some citizens 
choose not to register as a means of “expressing displeasure with the 
electoral process,”33 but this is beside the point. To understand whether AVR 
compels speech, the relevant question is whether compelling the affirmative 
 
 29 Though it is technically possible that AVR’s opt-out options could still save it from 
unconstitutionality even if the law does compel speech, a comprehensive discussion of opt-out provisions 
is beyond the scope of this Essay. This piece argues that AVR does not unconstitutionally compel speech, 
which dispels the need to evaluate whether opt-out provisions would make the policy constitutional. 
 30 As a general matter, AVR regulates conduct, not speech because “[i]t affects what [individuals] 
must do”—register to vote—“not what they may or may not say.” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 60 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 31 One recent article makes a conclusory statement in its opening sentence regarding the expressive 
value of registering to vote but provides no specific justification for its claim—rather the authors 
extensively discuss voting itself and registering others to vote as a form of speech. See Armand Derfner 
& J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 471 (2016) (“It seems like an 
obvious proposition that a citizen registering to vote or casting a ballot is engaging in free speech, a 
fundamental right entitled to full protection under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”); see also John R. Kramer, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg’s “The Scholar as Advocate,” 
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 402–03 (1993) (offering no explanation for a passing reference to First 
Amendment problems inherent in requiring voter registration as a condition for receiving benefits). 
 32 At least one state supreme court has considered a similar question, but it did so in the context of a 
state constitutional qualification for serving as a state representative. See Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262 
(Mo. 2016) (en banc). In relevant part, the Missouri Supreme Court determined that a candidate’s 
intentional failure to register to vote “for the purpose of political protest” did not invoke First Amendment 
protection. Id. at 269–71. The Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis largely agrees with the argument of 
this Essay. See id. at 271 (holding that “Johns’ failure to register to vote does not invoke First Amendment 
protection” because the conduct—or lack thereof—is not “inherently expressive”).  
 Numerous lower courts have addressed the entirely separate question of whether the act of registering 
others to vote is expressive conduct. As one court described it, voter registration drives are inextricably 
imbued with core speech because they include efforts to “persuade others to vote, educate potential voters 
about upcoming political issues, communicate their political support for particular issues, and otherwise 
enlist like-minded citizens in promoting shared political, economic, and social positions.” League of 
Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2006). For additional cases 
discussing voter registration drives, see the cases cited in David Feinstein, Note, A New Approach to 
Judicial Scrutiny of Voter Registration Laws, 2014 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 69. 
 33 Knight, supra note 11. It is not clear from her presentation whether Commissioner McCormick 
agrees with this notion that registering to vote—and participating in elections more broadly—signals 
acceptance of the electoral process. Commissioner McCormick does offer a few reasons that someone 
might not want to register, which may provide insight. Some are purely functional, like not wanting to be 
called for jury duty, or wanting to register in another state. Others could arguably implicate protected 
speech, like objections due to “[r]eligious affiliation,” refusing to register because “[n]o candidate or 
issue . . . inspires them enough to register and vote,” or abstaining because you “simply object to it.” 
McCormick Presentation, supra note 2. 
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act of registering to vote violates the First Amendment.34 In other words, is 
the government forcing political expression by automatically registering 
you? Recognizing this distinction, Commissioner McCormick argues that 
actively registering to vote is “the embodiment of political speech protected 
by the [First] Amendment”—that is, for some, registering to vote expresses 
support for the electoral process. 35 
Contrary to Commissioner McCormick’s argument, however, First 
Amendment jurisprudence suggests that voter registration is not politically 
expressive. In United States v. O’Brien, the Court recognized that some 
forms of “symbolic speech” were deserving of First Amendment protection, 
but it rejected the view that “conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the 
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”36 Instead, 
the Court extends First Amendment coverage to conduct that is “inherently 
expressive.”37 Even though it is possible for someone to register to vote with 
the intent to convey a particular message of support for the electoral process, 
that action does not become inherently political conduct merely because the 
actor intends to express an idea. Spence v. Washington’s test for coverage of 
nonverbal activity confirms this reading: even if a registrant intends “to 
convey a particularized message” that they support the electoral process, 
their nonverbal activity does not warrant coverage under the First 
Amendment unless the “likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed” the act of registering.38  
The Roberts Court’s analysis in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights offers further insight into why AVR might not 
unconstitutionally compel speech. In Rumsfeld, law schools brought a 
compelled speech challenge against the Solomon Amendment, which 
required the Department of Defense to deny federal funding to higher 
education institutions that did not allow military recruiting on campus.39 
Prior to the Solomon Amendment, law schools expressed their disagreement 
with the military by treating military recruiters differently, “[b]ut these 
 
 34 Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (refusing to allow the State of New Hampshire 
to require individuals to display the state motto on license plates, not because covering the motto was 
expressive, but because the motto itself was an “ideological message” and law forced the individual “to 
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to [that] ideological point of view”). 
 35 McCormick Presentation, supra note 2. This statement is a change from her 2015 presentation, in 
which she claimed that “[v]oting is inherently political speech,” which is a distinct issue from whether 
registering to vote is inherently speech. See 2015 Presentation, supra note 4. 
 36 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 37 Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006). 
 38 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 39 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 51. The Court considered both whether the Solomon Amendment compelled 
speech and whether the law compelled expressive conduct. The Court found that, as a general matter, the 
Amendment regulated conduct, not speech. Id. at 69–70. 
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actions were expressive only because the law schools accompanied their 
conduct with speech explaining it.”40 Thus, the expressive component was 
“not created by the conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it”—
“[t]he fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that 
the conduct at issue here is not so inherently expressive that it warrants 
protection.”41 
Registering to vote seems to similarly lack inherent expressive value.42 
Though a democracy advocate could explain that their registration signifies 
faith in the electoral process, absent that additional speech, it is unlikely “that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”43 And even with 
that accompanying explanatory speech, registering to vote does not implicate 
the First Amendment. The Rumsfeld Court made this exact point in an 
analogous situation: compulsory income taxes. The Court clarified that “if 
an individual announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the 
Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes”—which is 
exactly the kind of disapproval allegedly expressed by refusing to register to 
vote—“[n]either O’Brien nor its progeny supports” a result determining that 
“the Tax Code violates the First Amendment.”44 Logic suggests that 
precedent similarly would not support striking down AVR as a First 
Amendment violation. That is, if the same disaffected individual announces 
his intent to express disapproval of the electoral system by refusing to 
register to vote, First Amendment precedent does not support a result 
determining that AVR unconstitutionally compels speech. 
Further evidence that AVR is not compelled political speech comes 
from the Supreme Court’s unconstitutional condition cases. In Alliance for 
Open Society International, the Roberts Court maintained that the 
government cannot condition the receipt of a benefit—much less the exercise 
of a constitutional right—on the affirmation of a belief.45 If voter registration 
was expressive conduct espousing a particular view, then the traditional 
 
 40 Id. at 66. Specifically, law schools would require military recruiters to interview on the 
undergraduate campus, while allowing other recruiters to conduct interviews on the law school campus. 
Id. at 53. 
 41 Id. at 66. 
 42 Of course, the act of registering expresses something, namely registration; it also expresses one’s 
address and name. But, much like the Court’s example of tax filings—which express plentiful information 
about your personal finances—the speech inherent in registering to vote nevertheless does not trigger 
First Amendment coverage. 
 43 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 
(1974)). 
 44 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66. 
 45 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 221 (2013) (finding that 
a requirement that “compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a belief that by its nature 
cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program . . . violates the First Amendment”). 
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registration system—in which you have to register (i.e., affirm a belief) in 
order to vote (i.e., exercise a constitutional right)—would be an 
unconstitutional condition.46 Even Commissioner McCormick does not 
believe that all voter registration is unconstitutional; for example, she openly 
supports automated (rather than automatic) registration, which allows 
individuals to register to vote when interacting with a state agency, such as 
renewing a drivers’ license.47 Yet striking down any voter registration 
requirement as an unconstitutional condition would be the logical 
consequence of treating registration as the affirmation of a belief. And her 
argument that AVR is compelled speech necessarily assumes that registering 
to vote expresses such a belief. 
Therefore, longstanding precedent provides a strong constitutional 
defense of AVR. Registering to vote should not be understood as expressive 
for First Amendment purposes, and AVR should not be considered 
unconstitutional compelled speech. 
B. A Note on Scrutiny 
The level of scrutiny that applies to AVR depends on how one 
characterizes both the nature of the speech and the severity of the burden. 
Commissioner McCormick suggested in her remarks that strict scrutiny must 
apply in evaluating AVR, relying on cases addressing both the right to vote 
and freedom of speech.48 But even if the Court were to find that registering 
to vote implicates the First Amendment, precedent involving voting 
regulations that indirectly burden other rights counsels against treating AVR 
as a speech restriction that warrants strict scrutiny. 
Commissioner McCormick argues—unpersuasively—that registering 
to vote is core political speech.49 Even if this were true, strict scrutiny is not 
a given. “Exacting scrutiny”—which is arguably different from strict 
 
 46 See generally Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (describing the fundamental 
right to vote); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to “the political franchise 
of voting” as a “fundamental political right”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) 
(“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially 
since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic 
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and 
meticulously scrutinized.”). 
 47 Theobald, supra note 6.  
 48 See 2015 Presentation, supra note 4 (first quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62; then quoting 
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937); and then quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Generally, government regulations that directly burden political speech 
receive strict scrutiny, meaning that the government must show that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve 
a compelling government interest.  
 49 See McCormick Presentation, supra note 2. 
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scrutiny50—applies when an election regulation directly burdens core 
political speech.51 But not even Commissioner McCormick would argue that 
AVR directly targets speech; rather, any burden on speech is incidental. 
Instead, the Supreme Court applies a flexible standard, known as the 
Anderson-Burdick framework, to evaluate voting regulations that indirectly 
infringe on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.52 Under this framework, 
courts must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff 
seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as 
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration 
“the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's 
rights.”53 
 If an election regulation imposes “severe” burdens on First or 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, it must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state 
interest of compelling importance.”54 However, when a state’s election law 
“imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” rational basis review applies, 
under which a state’s “‘important regulatory interests are generally sufficient 
to justify’ the restrictions.”55 
Burdick involved, in part, a First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s 
prohibition on write-in votes.56 The Court recognized the speech inherent in 
voting,57 but it explicitly rejected the presumption that laws burdening the 
right to vote “must be subject to strict scrutiny,”58 despite the fact that strict 
scrutiny is usually applied to restrictions on core political speech.59 The 
Burdick Court realized that “[e]lection laws will invariably impose some 
burden upon individual voters”—whether on their right to vote or their 
 
 50 Depending on the context, the Court is not always clear on whether “exacting scrutiny” is 
equivalent to strict scrutiny or less severe. Compare Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 232 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that “strict scrutiny” should apply instead of the lesser “exacting scrutiny”), with 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 n.10 (1995) (equating “exacting scrutiny” with 
“strict scrutiny”).  
 51 See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345–46. 
 52 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (applying Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 
(1983)). 
 53 Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 54 Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). This heightened standard of review for 
severe restrictions resembles traditional strict scrutiny. 
 55 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. at 438 (noting that voters “express their views in the voting booth”). 
 58 Id. at 432. 
 59 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Laws that burden political speech 
are ‘subject to strict scrutiny’.”) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
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freedoms of speech and association—but “subject[ing] every voting 
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to 
assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”60 
Rather, the Court employed the now-dominant balancing test under 
which “the rigorousness of [the constitutional] inquiry . . . depends upon the 
extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First . . . Amendment 
rights.”61 The Court relied on a history of “repeatedly uph[olding] 
reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling 
expressive activity at the polls” in finding that the state law prohibiting write-
in votes was constitutional.62 The tenuous nature of claiming that 
affirmatively registering to vote is speech, combined with the small number 
of people whose rights are potentially burdened and AVR’s opt-out option,63 
suggests that AVR imposes a relatively low burden on First Amendment 
rights and likely warrants lesser scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick—that is, 
if it warrants scrutiny at all. 
It is worth addressing the counterargument that the Anderson-Burdick 
standard could be inapposite: Burdick involved a restriction on the First 
Amendment right to associate, not the right of free speech.64 However, this 
should not carry much weight, in part because the Court recognized the 
presence of speech elements at play in Burdick; the Court was not convinced 
to apply strict scrutiny even though voters “express their views in the voting 
booth.”65 Further, in other contexts, like petition circulation—which is “core 
political speech,” where “First Amendment protection” is usually “at its 
zenith”—the Court has nevertheless offered the caveat that “there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some 
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”66 
Though it is true that a direct regulation of core political speech—like 
a ban on anonymous campaign literature—always warrants “exacting 
scrutiny,” the Anderson-Burdick framework generally governs when a 
regulation seeks to “control the mechanics of the electoral process.”67 AVR 
 
 60 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. 
 61 Id. at 434. 
 62 Id. at 438. 
 63 However, AVR’s opt-out reasoning alone may not suffice to justify lesser scrutiny, as the 
government cannot “require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.” Pac. Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). 
 64 It is also worth noting that, in dicta, the Burdick Court described a “[r]easonable regulation of 
elections” as one that “does not require voters to espouse positions that they do not support.” Burdick, 
504 U.S. at 438. In theory, if AVR is compelled speech, it necessarily requires such espousal. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999) (internal citations omitted). 
 67 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345, 347 (1995). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
182 
seeks to regulate election mechanics, not to intentionally and directly burden 
core political speech. 
III. DEFENDING AVR AGAINST THE ROBERTS COURT’S SHIFTING 
COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE  
The Roberts Court has passed down several decisions crucial to the 
above analysis, including the compelled speech ruling in Rumsfeld68 and the 
unconstitutional conditions analysis in Alliance for Open Society 
International.69 Notwithstanding the clarity with which those cases would 
dispose of a compelled speech challenge to AVR, three other recent cases 
suggest a troubling shift toward expanding the set of actions that constitute 
expressive conduct, broadening the definition of compelled speech, and 
extending the application of strict scrutiny to new classes of cases. 
This Part defends AVR against developing trends in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,70 Janus v. AFSCME,71 and 
NIFLA v. Becerra.72 Each of these cases has already received thorough 
academic treatment. This Essay does not intend to offer novel critiques of 
the content of these opinions—such an undertaking would require 
significantly more space than this piece has to offer. Rather, I suggest that 
improper expansion of trends in these cases would lead to outcomes that are 
entirely foreign to the First Amendment as we know it. Overextending the 
logic of these cases could lead to the troubling result of striking down AVR 
as compelled speech; that conclusion serves as a warning about absurdities 
lurking within the Roberts Court’s recent First Amendment opinions. 
A. Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Expansion of Expressive Conduct 
A small faction of the Court seems to be relaxing its views on what 
constitutes covered conduct to include acts that are not inherently expressive. 
This view must not prevail, lest—contrary to the analysis in Part II—a whole 
slew of activities, from tax filing to voter registration, might be erroneously 
considered expressive conduct. As explained above, AVR does not 
unconstitutionally compel speech so long as the act of registering itself is not 
politically expressive conduct.73 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a 2018 
case, involved a baker’s claim that a state law requiring that he make a 
 
 68 Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 69 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205 (2013). 
 70 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 71 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 72 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 73 See supra Part II.A. 
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wedding cake for a same-sex couple “violate[d] his First Amendment right 
to free speech by compelling him to . . . express a message with which he 
disagreed.”74 The Court issued a narrow ruling on free exercise of religion 
grounds;75 however, the free speech claim was addressed by Justice Thomas 
in a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch. 
Justice Thomas argued that the baker, Jack Phillips, was engaged in 
expressive conduct because “Phillips considers himself an artist.”76 He 
continued by noting that Phillips “sees the inherent symbolism in wedding 
cakes”—specifically explaining that “[t]o [Phillips], a wedding cake 
inherently communicates that ‘a wedding has occurred, a marriage has 
begun, and the couple should be celebrated.’”77 Yet, this argument should be 
irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis; conduct cannot be labelled 
expressive simply because “the person engaging in the conduct intends 
thereby to express an idea.”78 It is oxymoronic to say that a cake inherently 
expresses a particular message to Phillips specifically; if a message is 
inherent, it is a permanent attribute or essential element of something, such 
that anyone and everyone would understand it.79 
Recognizing the limitation of his argument, Justice Thomas tried to 
argue that, more broadly, “[w]edding cakes do, in fact, communicate this 
message.”80 To support this claim, Justice Thomas relies on an obscure 
dessert history book81 for a statement that “[w]edding cakes are so packed 
with symbolism that it is hard to know where to begin.”82 Justice Thomas 
suggests that “a wedding cake needs no particular design or written words to 
communicate the basic message that a wedding is occurring, a marriage has 
begun, and the couple should be celebrated.”83 The problem is that the first 
two “messages” are not expressive for First Amendment purposes; they are 
just contextual facts. The only possible unconstitutionally compelled 
 
 74 138 S. Ct. at 1726. 
 75 Id. at 1729–31. 
 76 Id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 77 Id. at 1743 (quotation marks omitted). 
 78 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 79 See Inherent, VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 969 (2d ed. 1989) (“Existing in something as a 
permanent attribute or quality; forming an element, esp. a characteristic or essential element of something; 
belonging to the intrinsic nature of that which is spoken of; indwelling, intrinsic, essential.”). 
 80 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).  
 81 It is not clear why this book should offer convincing support, as it is not even a best-seller within 
its own narrow category. See Sweet Invention: A History of Dessert, AMAZON.COM, 
https://www.amazon.com/Sweet-Invention-History-Michael-Krondl/dp/161373655X [https://perma.cc/
Q4JJ-ZN7T] (ranking below 3000th among “gastronomy history” books). 
 82 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1743 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting MICHAEL 
KRONDL, SWEET INVENTION: A HISTORY OF DESSERT 321 (2011). 
 83 Id. at 1743 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
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expression is the idea that “the couple should be celebrated,” but Justice 
Thomas offers no specific support for the inherence of that message in the 
act of baking a cake.84 And if wedding cakes, as a medium, do express these 
messages, it does not necessarily follow that this is the kind of speech that 
warrants First Amendment coverage.85 In effect, Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch are signing onto the view that whether conduct is expressive should 
turn, at least in some cases, on whether the actor intends for it to be.86 
There is a clear problem with broadening the definition of expressive 
conduct in this manner. A First Amendment jurisprudence that links 
protection to intent becomes immediately untenable; it opens the door to 
claims that any kind of public accommodation is compelled speech if the 
actor believes there is expressive value in his work. As Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky described it, “[i]f baking a cake is speech, then so is cooking 
food or, as in other cases that have arisen, taking pictures or making floral 
arrangements. Any business could refuse to serve gay weddings—or for that 
matter anyone—by claiming that the antidiscrimination law constitutes 
impermissible compelled speech.”87 Concerningly, Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch may not be alone in this view. Professor Chemerinsky warns that 
“[a]t the oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice[] Alito . . . asked questions and made comments that left no doubt as 
to how they would vote” on the First Amendment issue.88 
AVR provides a strong example not to follow the trail of breadcrumbs 
laid by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch: relaxing the inherence 
requirement for evaluating expressive conduct would unravel a key 
argument against characterizing voter registration as expressive conduct.89 
 
 84 Some might agree that wedding cakes do inherently express “celebration,” but that the message 
belongs to the customers, not the baker. See, e.g., Labdhi Sheth & Molly Christ, Comment, Let Them Eat 
Cake: Why Public Proprietors of Wedding Goods and Services Must Equally Serve All People, 
52 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 211, 232 (2018) (“The customer chooses the type of cake, the occasion, the 
color of the frosting, and the words on the cake. Thus, the customer’s First Amendment rights are at 
issue.”). However, that issue is beside the point for this Essay; what matters is that Justice Thomas, first 
and foremost, relies on subjective, individual interpretations of expression as the metric for identifying 
expressive conduct. 
 85 For example, my tax filings express the message that “I am paying my taxes,” but that does not 
mean taxes violate the First Amendment. Similarly, no coverage is warranted just because a wedding case 
expresses that “a wedding is occurring.” 
 86 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 87 Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Masterpiece: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications
/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/not-a-masterpiece/ 
[https://perma.cc/RA59-72DX]. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See supra text accompanying notes 32–38 (arguing that the expression inherent in registering to 
vote is not the kind of speech that implicates the First Amendment). 
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Part II explained why Supreme Court precedent does not support the 
determination that AVR violates the First Amendment,90 but relying on 
Justice Thomas’s logic would open the door to compelled speech challenges 
to AVR. Doing so would be deeply problematic; whatever expression may 
be inherent in registering to vote, it is not the kind of speech that qualifies 
for First Amendment coverage. 
B. Janus and the Expanding Definition of Compelled Speech 
The Court has also showed signs of extending its traditional compelled 
speech analysis into areas that were previously given separate treatment. In 
another 2018 case, Janus v. AFSCME, the Court essentially gutted public 
unions by holding that laws requiring union dues for public employees 
violate the First Amendment by compelling nonmembers to subsidize private 
speech on matters of substantial public concern.91 In doing so, the Court 
overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,92 a precedent that had 
governed for over forty years. 
Abood had held that, even though mandatory union dues for 
nonmembers inevitably infringe on First Amendment rights, that 
infringement was, at least in part, justified by the importance of the union to 
labor relations.93 Nonmembers could be assessed fees to cover the costs of 
“collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,” 
but they may opt not to have their dues used “to contribute to political 
candidates and to express political views unrelated to [union] duties”.94 Even 
for the permissible uses of nonmember fees, the Abood Court recognized 
significant First Amendment burdens: 
To compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining 
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests. An 
employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of 
activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive representative. His 
moral or religious views about the desirability of abortion may not square with 
the union’s policy in negotiating a medical benefits plan. One individual might 
disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing 
that to be the road to serfdom for the working class, while another might have 
economic or political objections to unionism itself. An employee might object 
to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed to limit 
inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the collective-
 
 90 See supra text accompanying notes 36–47. 
 91 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 92 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 93 Abood, 431 U.S. at 222–23. 
 94 Id. at 225–26, 234. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
186 
bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination. The examples could be 
multiplied. To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining 
agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an 
employee’s freedom to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain 
from doing so, as he sees fit.95 
Nevertheless, the Court determined in Abood that “such interference as 
exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the 
important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations 
established by Congress.”96 Essentially, in balancing the First Amendment 
harms against the legitimate legislative interests, the state’s interests came 
out on top. 
However, in an opinion by Justice Alito, the Roberts Court reversed 
course in Janus and held that conduct that previously was not considered 
unconstitutional compelled speech is now a violation of the First 
Amendment.97 In announcing the decision to overrule Abood, the Court 
stated that “there are very strong reasons in this case” to overturn precedent,98 
suggesting that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at stake.”99 Further, 
Justice Alito noted that Abood “is inconsistent with other First Amendment 
cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions.”100 And despite 
protest from dissenters,101 the majority decided that “no reliance interests on 
the part of public-sector unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of 
the free speech violations that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 
years.”102 
Some might wrongly argue that Janus’s logic should extend to voting 
regulations like AVR. In Janus, the Court struck down a state requirement 
that—per the Court’s own prior analysis—had incidental effects on speech 
but otherwise served legitimate government ends.103 Cast in this light, 
Abood’s analysis—finding that “important government interests . . . 
presumptively support the impingement” of First Amendment rights104—
looks a lot like the Anderson-Burdick framework’s application to 
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on voters’ First Amendment 
 
 95 Id. at 222. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 
 98 Id. at 2460. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting the “massive reliance interests at stake”). 
 102 Id. at 2460. 
 103 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 225 (1977). 
 104 Id. 
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rights.105 If the Roberts Court was willing to upend the balancing of First 
Amendment rights with important government interests in the union context, 
who is to say that they will not feel empowered to do the same in the voting-
regulation arena? 
Critics of AVR could claim that the justifications offered by Justice 
Alito in Janus should be applied in the voting-regulation context. In doing 
so, they would argue that “[f]undamental free speech rights are at stake”106 
in many voting regulations, like Burdick’s ban on write-in voting, and that 
the Court should hold that similar free speech rights are burdened by AVR.107 
Such arguments may be welcomed by the minority of Justices who feel that 
Anderson-Burdick, like Abood, “is inconsistent with other First Amendment 
cases,”108 and who have made an effort to undermine its reasoning.109 Further, 
since AVR is a relatively new policy, there are not strong reliance interests 
at stake, giving those same Justices an excuse to hold AVR unconstitutional. 
More broadly, following Janus, critics will argue that it does not matter if 
there are strong reliance interests in the Anderson-Burdick framework, as 
they would be insufficient “to justify the perpetuation of the free speech 
violations.”110 
Fortunately, AVR should be spared from any such attempt to extend 
Janus’s reasoning. For one, the speech at issue is hardly comparable. In 
Janus, public union dues were held unconstitutional because they were used 
to support public sector bargaining which translated into a host of political 
views about how the state should spend public funds.111 Whether that speech 
was the type that the “government can regulate . . . in its capacity as an 
employer” was up for debate,112 but the speech clearly expressed a political 
 
 105 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
788 (1983)) (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory 
interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.”). 
 106 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 107 See supra Part II. 
 108 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 109 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 207 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (arguing that, notwithstanding Anderson-Burdick, “[w]hen a State’s election law directly 
regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the challenged restriction to strict scrutiny”); 
id. at 208 (“I suspect that when regulations of core political speech are at issue it makes little difference 
whether we determine burden first because restrictions on core political speech so plainly impose a 
‘severe burden.’”). 
 110  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 111 See id. at 2474–77. 
 112 Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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view.113 The same cannot be said for registering to vote which, at most, 
expresses the fact of registration.114 
More broadly, the Court has continually recognized and affirmed the 
need to show deference to reasonable regulation of elections, even when 
applying heightened scrutiny. Even when the Court purports to apply pure 
First Amendment scrutiny to election laws burdening core political speech—
like in Doe v. Reed, in which the Court upheld a law permitting the disclosure 
of petition signers’ names115—it nevertheless applies something arguably 
less than strict scrutiny, often called exacting scrutiny, and appears to engage 
in a similar balancing of sorts.116 The Doe Court cited Burdick when 
explaining the need to “allow States significant flexibility in implementing 
their own voting systems.”117 
From a practical perspective, disposing of the Anderson-Burdick 
framework and applying strict scrutiny to all laws that incidentally burden 
First Amendment rights would spell disaster for election administration; 
nearly all voting regulations impact speech in some capacity.118 It is critical 
for a functional democracy that the Court permit states to “control the 
mechanics of the electoral process” through regulations like AVR, even 
when there may be minor incidental burdens on speech.119 
C. NIFLA and Limiting Lesser Scrutiny 
Another recent case raises concerns that the Court is narrowing the 
categories within compelled speech where it would have previously applied 
 
 113 Even Abood found that “[t]o compel employees financially to support their collective-bargaining 
representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests.” 431 U.S. at 222. 
 114 See supra note 42. 
 115 Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196, 202 (2010). 
 116 Id. at 196 (applying “exacting scrutiny”); see id. at 232 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
“strict scrutiny” should apply instead). 
 117 Id. at 195–96 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992)). 
 118 See supra text accompanying notes 63–68; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (“[T]o subject every 
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that 
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”). This is not meant as a comprehensive defense of 
Anderson-Burdick; there are plenty of reasons to criticize the standard when it is used to allow states to 
infringe the right to vote under the guise of election regulation. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of 
Two Election Law Standards, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/
expertforum/a-tale-of-two-election-law-standards/ [https://perma.cc/P6YT-46S3] (“Anderson-Burdick 
balancing is itself flawed, and the courts must recognize the centrality of the right to vote to our 
democratic system and impose stringent rules on governments that try to infringe on that right.”). 
 119 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995). 
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lesser scrutiny.120 In NIFLA v. Becerra, the Court struck down a California 
law requiring licensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice 
stating the existence of publicly-funded contraception and abortions, and 
requiring unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics to disseminate a notice stating 
that they were not licensed.121 The case appeared to be governed by Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Court had 
evaluated the alleged First Amendment right of a physician “not to provide 
information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated 
by the State.”122 The Casey Court had stated that “[t]o be sure, the physician’s 
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, . . . but only as part of 
the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by 
the State.”123 Thus, any compelled speech involved presented no 
constitutional issue.124 
In NIFLA, Justice Thomas changed course, striking down the California 
law as impermissible compelled speech.125 Justice Thomas argued that there 
are only two exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny for compelled 
professional speech: “laws that require professionals to disclose factual, 
noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’”126 and laws 
regulating professional conduct that “incidentally involve[] speech,” as in 
Casey.127 The Court then avoided that latter category by arguing that the 
California law was “not tied to a procedure at all,” making it a regulation of 
speech rather than of professional conduct.128 Here, unlike Janus, the Court 
avoided overruling precedent to broaden the use of strict scrutiny. Rather, it 
narrowed the categories that warrant lessened scrutiny in order to determine 
that the challenged law demanded stricter review. 
Assuming the Court were to find that registering to vote is political 
speech, the Court could theoretically use the same maneuver to shift AVR 
out of the Anderson-Burdick framework and instead automatically apply 
strict scrutiny. For example, the Court could narrow Burdick by saying it 
 
 120 Technically, the Janus Court did not apply strict scrutiny; though the Court found that “exacting 
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 121 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375, 2378 (2018). 
 122 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 123 Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. 
NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2367.  
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only applies to election regulations involving “activity at the polls.”129 Voter 
registration—setting aside the possibility of same-day voter registration—
does not fall within the category of “activity at the polls.”  
Fortunately for AVR, just days before NIFLA was decided, the Court 
strongly indicated that it would reinforce—rather than narrow—the 
application of lesser scrutiny to reasonable voting regulations that impinge 
on speech. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (MVA), the Court struck 
down Minnesota’s broad ban on wearing political apparel in polling 
places.130 However, even though the Court determined that the law was 
unconstitutional, it declined to apply strict scrutiny. Rather, the Court 
announced that “[a] polling place . . . qualifies as a nonpublic forum,” and, 
in doing so, the Court shifted the speech regulation into a lesser tier of 
scrutiny.131 In a nonpublic forum, the government has “much more flexibility 
to craft rules limiting speech” provided that “the regulation on speech is 
reasonable” and viewpoint-based.132 The Court displayed “a more realistic 
and functional understanding of the political process,” recognizing that 
regulation of the speech-filled work of elections is inevitable and 
necessary.133 
This is not to say that we should expect the Roberts Court to analyze 
AVR as part of a nonpublic forum, but the nonpublic forum analysis, which 
defers to “reasonable” “regulation,”134 resembles the lower end of the 
Anderson-Burdick framework. Thus, this decision signals general movement 
in the right direction for AVR, especially when the two regulations are 
compared: Political apparel is core political speech; registration has no 
inherent political message. MVA’s ban directly burdened speech; AVR 
regulates election mechanics with only incidental impacts on speech. If the 
Roberts Court is moving toward applying lesser scrutiny to polling-place 
restrictions on core political speech, we should not expect the same bench to 
shift AVR into a higher tier of scrutiny. 
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CONCLUSION 
As troubling as it may be to see a top U.S. election official publicly 
laying the groundwork for a First Amendment challenge to AVR, it is more 
troubling still to wonder if the Court might actually rule in favor of such a 
claim. This Essay’s application of long-standing precedent offers a strong 
defense of the view that registering to vote is not politically expressive 
conduct, and even if it were, AVR likely would receive lesser scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, decisions by the Roberts Court show a concerning trend 
toward expanding protections to subjectively expressive conduct and 
broadening the scope of compelled speech doctrine while narrowing safe 
harbors that warrant lesser scrutiny. Fortunately, it does not take much to see 
that the Court’s burgeoning analysis is deeply mistaken. For now, there are 
strong defenses against extending each of these trends to AVR. Yet, the 
application of these cases’ logic to a hypothetical AVR challenge should 
raise alarm bells. The possible implications extend far beyond voter 
registration; if extended too far, the Court’s trends would subject nearly all 
voting regulations to strict scrutiny, if only because of incidental 
infringements on speech. 
